A Reflection on Native Americans and the Religion Clauses
There is a relatively longstanding recognition that for Indians, free exercise
of religion, because of the tribal nature of the religion, may require a degree of
establishment of religion. Thus, Native American tribal culture sits uneasily within
the U.S. constitutional structure. This essay is a brief meditation on the
development of constitutional doctrine on the religion clauses and historical links
between that development and Native Americans. (I had greater ambitions for the
piece but time has run out.)

I. Three Decades of Religious Freedom: Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) to the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (2000)
As a basically individualist liberal most of the time, I have generally viewed
with dismay the section of the Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Court opinion that
privileges religious groups such as the Amish over secular cultural groups who
might be united by a devotion to particular non-religiously-motivated ways of life,
such as those advocated by Thoreau (406 U.S. 205, at 215-217). From my usual
perspective, this Yoder passage has always seemed to mark the Court’s policy as
one plainly favoring religion as against non-religion, and therefore to be plainly
contrary to what I have understood to be the sense of the Establishment Clause. As
is well known, the Court had announced in the unanimous Lemon v. Kurtzman
(1971) decision that the religion clauses together forbid legislation with the
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primary effect of benefiting or hindering one religion or religion in general (cit to
Lemon test page). The Court’s ruling in Yoder the very next year that states must
carve out special exemptions for religions like the Amish from their mandatory
schooling requirements but have no similar obligation for exempting the children
of parents with secular objections to high school attendance seemed to flatly
contradict this piece of the Lemon test.
Thus it was not surprising when Justice Scalia in 1990 in Employment Div.
of Oregon v. Smith turned its back on this piece of the Yoder reasoning, although
Scalia’s degree of duplicity in doing so was a shock, at least to gullible old me.
Scalia claimed that Wisconsin v. Yoder had NOT BEEN a ruling endorsing the
principle that the free exercise clause calls upon states to allow religious objectors
to otherwise valid secular laws to be given an exemption from the laws unless
government had a compelling reason for refusing the exemption. Rather, claimed
Scalia, Yoder combined the claims of the free exercise clause with a truly
fundamental right, that of familial privacy, and only because this additional
fundamental right was at stake was the exemption from school attendance rules
required by the Court.1

1

Scalia wrote in Employment Div. v. Smith [at 494 U.S. 872, 882],
“The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
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Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as …the right of parents… to direct the
education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance
laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious
grounds to send their children to school).”
Cf. the Court opinion in Yoder, which first emphasized the
religiosity of the claim, in order to link it to the free exercise
clause and then explicitly for that reason invoked the compelling
interest test:
“A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations;
to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims
must be rooted in religious belief. Although a
determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice
entitled to constitutional protection may present a most
delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards
on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has
important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their
claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection
of the contemporary secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his
time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims
would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was
philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such
belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion
Clauses.
“Giving no weight to such secular considerations,
however, we see that the record in this case abundantly
supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the
Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but
one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized
group” (406 U.S., 215-216).
“The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on
respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only
severe, but inescapable” (at 218). “A regulation neutral on
its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if
it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion” (at 221).
“We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its
interest in its system of compulsory education is so
compelling that even the established religious practices of
the Amish must give way” (221). And, “We must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by
its requirement for compulsory education to age 16”(221).
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As is also well-known, Congress then attempted to undo Employment
Division’s revision of free exercise doctrine by enacting, with only three dissenting
votes in the entire Congress, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.2
This Act provided that in instances where a generally applicable law “substantially
burdens” religious exercise, state and federal government must grant a waiver from
the law unless the government has a “compelling interest” in refusing to do so and
unless the legal requirement is the “least restrictive [upon religion] means of
furthering that compelling interest.” The Supreme Court struck down the portion
of RFRA that applied to state government in Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997). Congress followed up by enacting the Religious Liberty Protection Act in
2000.3 This law re-enacted the RFRA rules for state governments but limited them
to two kinds of situations: (1) those involving land-use issues that would affect
commerce among the states because of the use of construction/remodeling

It is not only shocking that Scalia would so blatantly
mischaracterize free exercise precedent(and OConnor’s dissent plainly
indicates her annoyance about it), but it is peculiarly ironic that
he would rely instead for the compelling interest requirement on the
right of privacy, surely not his favorite constitutional right.
See,e.g, Michael H. v. Gerald. D (give cit.) An additional oddity of
the Employment Division decision is that compelling arguments were
available indicating that prior to the Court’s decision the case had
been rendered moot by out-of-court developments. These are detailed
in Louis Fisher, Religious Liberty in America (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Press, 2002), 186.
2

139 Cong.Rec.26416; 27239-41 (1993)

3

114 Stat.803 (2000).

5

materials and (2) those involving persons confined in state institutions (such as
prisons or hospitals) that received federal funds.
II. Brief Historical Overview of Government Treatment of Indian Religion
The “Smith” of Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith was a Klamath
Indian who had asserted a religiously-grounded obligation for the use of peyote,
which use had caused him to be fired from his job as a drug and alcohol counselor
in Oregon, precipitating his (denied) claim for unemployment benefits.4 This fact
is prominent in the Court’s analysis, but a number of broader connections tying
Native Americans to the history of RFRA are not so well-known.
It is an old story that when it came to American Indians, the U.S.
government honored neither the Constitution’s prohibition on establishment of
religion nor its prohibition on abridging free exercise thereof. Throughout colonial
history, American colonies had authorized missionary activity toward the Indians.
The Continental Congress continued this tradition, as did the early U.S.Congresses.
Congress viewed federal payments for this missionizing activity as a part of the
broader mission of bringing Indians into the mainstream of Western civilization
and did not note any tension between this missionary support and the religion
clauses. The federal civilizing fund lasted until 1873.5
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Federal funding of efforts to bring Native Americans into one or another
Christian sect and to obliterate Native religious traditions as backward
superstitions might appear to modern eyes as obvious violations of both religion
clauses, and perhaps as having been permitted only because Indians were
conquered foreigners who needed to be taught ways of life that would make them
less warlike toward us. But this impression would be erroneous. On the contrary,
these practices were far more similar in the nineteenth century to the treatment of
Americans generally by their governments than we of the 21st century tend to
remember. Public schools generally practiced the Christianizing of students as part
of teaching them the arts of western civilization. The reciting of Protestant prayers
and the studying of the Christian Bible were normal public school requirements.6
During the tragically brutal Indian removal period of 1830-1860, missionary
activity “dwindled to dormancy,” but then President Grant reinvigorated it in 1869,
re-starting appropriations to religious groups to run Indian schools.7 In the 1880s
tensions between Protestants and Catholics produced controversy over the
appropriating of federal funds for “sectarian schools” via contracts with religious
missions. Eventually this controversy caused the federal government to forbid the
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annual appropriating of money for missionary schools on reservations after 1899.8
Although Congress announced that it was ceasing such annual appropriations, in
fact, religious groups continued to educate reservation Indians, funding the schools
with money they continued to receive annually from the federal government in
terms mandated by specific treaties and in the form of interest from tribal trust
funds (derived from cessions of tribal land to the federal government).9 This
funding system was challenged in 1908 by a Native American, Quick Bear, as a
violation of the Congressional ban from 1899 on future appropriations for
“sectarian schools” for Indians, and also as violating “the spirit” of the
Establishment Clause.10 It was defended by lawyers for the U.S. Government as
not violating this statutory ban, since the money belonged to each tribe (in trust) to
expend as it chose. Government attorneys argued further that this application of
the Indian trust funds to sectarian schools not only did not violate the
Establishment Clause but also was required in order to honor the Free Exercise
Clause rights of the Indians.11 The Supreme Court agreed with both arguments of
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Ibid., 155-156. Also, attorneys’ briefs for Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210
U.S. 50(1908) detail this history, as does the Court opinion at 210
U.S., 78-80.
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the Solicitor General.12
In 1881 U.S. government policy ramped up the effort to obliterate traditional
Indian religions. Rather then leave matters to missionaries who may have varied in
their kindliness toward such practices, the administration enacted an official ban on
Indian funeral ceremonies and on the Sun Dance (which involved piercing of one’s
skin with a sharp stick).13 This executive regulation was part of a broader intense
assimilation campaign between 1881-1928 that included pressuring Indians to take
individual allotments from tribal land to become farmers and also included the
taking of Indian children into boarding schools for eight years where they were
made to dress and speak as Anglo-Americans and to abandon vestiges of Indian
religion.14
Some reforms began in the 1920s, stimulated by the lobbying of John
Collier, as Executive Secretary of the American Indian Defense Association, and
later by his acts as Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1934-1945). His efforts were
aided by the scholarship of Lewis Merriam, who in 1928, published a report
commissioned by The Institute for Government Research of Johns Hopkins
University, The Problem of Indian Administration. The report offered a harsh
12
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critique of most elements of U.S. Indian policy, including the wholesale effort to
destroy Indian religions. In 1924 Congress granted citizenship to all Indians born
within the territorial limits of the U.S. Once Collier became Commissioner (in
1934) he enacted administrative regulations that reversed prior policy: “No
interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial expression will hereafter be
tolerated….The fullest constitutional liberty, in all matters affecting religion,
conscience and culture, is insisted on for all Indians.”15
After a period of turmoil in the late forties and nineteen fifties, when efforts
to hand control over the Indians to state governments grew in popularity, the U.S.
Congress in 1962 finally began the current period of protecting Indian religious
freedom. The first steps were small--in 1962 adding to eagle-protection laws an
authorization for the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations protecting the
possession and use of eagles by Indians for religious purposes, and then the
issuance of such a regulation in 1963 for Indians engaged in “bonafide, authentic”
use of eagles for their religion.16 Then in 1968 Congress issued the Indian Civil
Rights Act, essentially listing the Bill of Rights from the U.S. Constitution and
applying them to protect Indians with respect to tribal governments. The Indian
Civil Rights Act pointedly omits the prohibition on laws “respecting an
15
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establishment of religion,” and but does specify that tribal governments may not
“make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.” 17
Plainly this piece of the Indian Civil Rights Act proceeded on the
understanding that for reservation Indians, because their religion WAS tribal, the
individual’s right of free exercise implicated a right to HAVE his tribe establish a
religion. A national coalition of Native American groups wanted a further
guarantee, in light of the federal government’s abysmal history, and lobbied
beginning in 1967 for specific federal support for Indian religious traditions.18
Those lobbying efforts bore fruit in the joint resolution of Congress entitled the
Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) of 1978. After recognizing that freedom
of religion in America has produced “a rich variety of religious traditions,” this
resolution states the following:19
“henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to
believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American
17

Fisher, ibid. 165-6. Congress moved again in 1970 in support of
Indian religion by ceding back to the Pueblo Indians forty-eight
thousand acres of land around Blue Lake near Taos New Mexico that
presidential order had taken from them in 1906. The Indians viewed
this as sacred land. Fisher, 167-168.
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Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the
freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.”
Section Two of the resolution orders the President to direct federal agencies
to re-evaluate their policies and procedures, in consultation with the religious
leaders of Native Americans, in order to determine changes necessary for
“preserv[ing] and protect[ing] Native American religious cultural rights and
practices.”20 The President was instructed to “report back to Congress the results
of his evaluation, including any changes that were made in administrative
policies…and any recommendations he may have for legislative action.”21 The
Carter Administration did this in August 1979, after a review in which more than
fifty federal agencies participated.22 Nonetheless, in the words of Justice
O’Connor, AIRFA did not “so much as … hint of any intent to create a cause of
action or any judicially enforceable individual rights.”23
III. AIRFA to RFRA to RLPA
The Supreme Court had decided Wisconsin v. Yoder just six years prior to
20
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AIRFA, and four years after the pro-religious-freedom tilt in the version of the Bill
of Rights that Congress had placed into the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Plainly, Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court were of like mind during this
period. Despite the neutrality language of the Lemon rule, they shared a desire to
have government go out of its way to support religious freedom. The Yoder
decision followed in the path set forth in Sherbert v. Verner (1963), which had
required religiously-based exemptions from restrictions on governmental
unemployment compensation so that persons who lose their jobs on the grounds of
religiously-based Sabbath-observance cannot be excluded from compensation.
Moreover, Sherbert had set forth a new rule of free exercise interpretation: Where
an otherwise neutral law places a “substantial infringement” or significant
“burden” on the exercise of someone’s religion, the state must grant that person an
exemption from the law unless it can show a compelling interest in not doing so.24
Sherbert marked a sharp break with precedents like Braunfeld v. Brown , 366 U.S
599 (1961), where sabbatarians had been refused exemptions from Sunday closing
laws of general applicabililty.25 Yoder extended the Sherbert path considerably,
however, because it was the first to require a religiously-based exemption from a
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See Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Sherbert to the effect
that he believed Braunfeld must now have been silently overruled, 374
U.S. 398, 413-418.
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CRIMINAL statute of general applicability (truancy laws). In its terms, although
(in contrast to Sherbert and Yoder) AIRFA did not mention anything as concrete
as the compelling governmental interest test, AIRFA did seem to embrace their
spirit. It placed government in a proactive position with respect to religious
freedom; government now was not simply to refrain from interfering with religious
exercise (as per the First Amendment) but was to extend itself in order to “preserve
and protect” religious observance. But only for Native Americans.
Between the Yoder decision embracing and extending the Sherbert rule, and
the Smith decision rejecting that rule except as applied to the two specific contexts
of unemployment compensation and Amish parents objecting to ninth and tenth
grade public schooling, the only decisions handed down that departed from the
Sherbert test were cases involving Native American religious claims, Bowen v. Roy
(1986), and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association (1988).26
Employment Division v. Smith was the third such Native American case, and the
one that finally pushed the Court majority openly to drop the test.
In two of the request-for-religious-exemption cases between 1972 and 1990,
26

I base this observation on the list provided by Justice Scalia in
Employment Division, the third case involving Native Americans to
depart from the Sherbert test. He does not categorize the cases this
way, instead dividing them among unemployment compensation cases
(which upheld exemption claims) and non-unemployment compensation
cases (which often did not), and among early post-Sherbert cases and
cases of “recent years,” 494 U.S. 872, 883-4. He adds that in cases
like Yoder, a non-unemployment based case, it was the addition of a
constitutional right other than free exercise (there, family privacy)
that triggered the compelling government interest test.
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U.S. v. Lee (1982) and Hernandez v. Commissioner of IRS, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)
the Court ruled that the Sherbert/Yoder test had been met by the government--both
cases involved federal taxes, and the Court reasoned that the successful operation
of a complex, nationwide tax scheme amounted to an overriding interest for which
it was “essential” that particularized religious objections not be honored, to assure
comprehensive participation.27 Two other case that rejected Sherbert/Yoder style
requests for religious exemptions emerged from contexts where security needs are
exceptionally strong and therefore constrict normal constitutional liberties. These
were Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), which involved the
governmental interest of a need for discipline within the military,28 and O’Lone v.
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), which involved the governmental interest of a need
for discipline within its prison system.
In other words, all of these cases between Yoder and Smith can be viewed as
having applied the Sherbert/Yoder test, except for the two Native American ones.
The first of those Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), presented a claim that if the
Social Security Administration were to use the social security number that it had
27
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See also the post-Sherbert (pre-Yoder)case of Gillette v. U.S., 401
U.S. 437, at 462 (1971), where the Court upheld the governmental
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particular wars (as distinguished from war per se), on the grounds
that it was “strictly justified by substantial governmental interests”
in doing what was “necessary” to “raise and support an army.”
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issued to Roy’s two-year-old daughter (unbeknownst to Roy) for record-keeping
with respect to the distribution of welfare benefits, the use of a social security
number would rob her of her spirit. Having to supply that number to the
government each month in order to obtain welfare benefits also would rob her of
her spirit. On the father’s desire to forbid the federal government to use her number
at all, the justices were unanimous. Free exercise does not entail a right to tell the
U.S. government how to manage its own records. After this point, this case broke
apart the five remaining justices from the original 6-justice majority of Yoder.
Burger, who had written the Yoder opinion, along with White who silently aligned
with him, wanted to apply ordinary rather than strict scrutiny because this case
involved a “requirement for the administration of welfare programs reaching many
millions of people.”29 Blackmun wanted to remand before deciding the merits
because he was not convinced that the federal government will insist on having
Bowen re-supply the social security number every time he obtains welfare benefits,
and if all that is at stake is the issuance of the number, since that is a fait accompli
the case may be moot.30 He agreed however with the three dissenters that if the
government were to insist that this number be provided every month in order to get
welfare benefits, that practice would be unconstitutional under Sherbert and Yoder.
29
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The other holdovers from Yoder, Brennan and Marshall, align with O’Connor in
dissent. Their view was that persons who objected to supplying their social
security number in order to get a government benefit on the ground that its use
would rob them of their spirit were so rare that allowing them an exemption from
that duty would not seriously burden the U.S. government. But Scalia’s claim that
the Court here did not apply the Sherbert/Yoder test is correct, because both White
and Burger were willing to drop the test for this context, essentially on the grounds
that the need for comprehensive fraud detection within the welfare system was
more like the tax setting of U.S. v. Lee and Hernandez v. Commissioners than like
the individualized hearings situations of unemployment compensation or criminal
prosecution. They were willing to say that in settings like this, the reasonableness
test made more sense than strict scrutiny.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian concerned not a claim of governmental robbing of
an individual’s spirit but of governmental actions within a twenty-five square mile
section of a National Forest that would deprive three Indian tribes of the
opportunity for certain of their members to engage in particular obligatory
meditation-style religious activities which they understood to benefit their entire
tribe. These activities had to be performed in this particular natural setting and that
setting had to be peaceful, quiet, and unmarred by man-made alterations. The
Indian association was attempting to get a court injunction against the building of a
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logging road. During the litigation, Congress had outlawed the planned timbercutting throughout the contested area so as to minimize disturbance to the Indians,
but they wanted to have the road itself also blocked. O’Connor wrote for the Court
and rejected the claim that this program to any significant degree “prohibited” the
free exercise of religion. She insisted that free exercise did not amount to a right to
a religiously motivated veto over a government program simply because the
program made it harder to practice one’s religion. Three of the four Yoder
holdovers, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissented on the grounds that a
government program rendering a particular religious practice impossible to carry
out did not substantially differ from a government program forbidding the practice,
and that the government had shown no compelling reason for the road. Again,
Scalia’s claim that the Sherbert test was not applied here is correct as to the formal
Court opinion. It is conceivable that White, the other Yoder holdover, went with
the majority because he agreed with the majority claim31 that the Sherbert test is
triggered only when the government is imposing some sort of coercive pressure
against religious action.
Two years later, in a third case involving Native American religion,
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court scrapped the Sherbert/Yoder rule for all
future cases except those involving the particular circumstances of the Sherbert
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and Yoder litigants.
The rejection of decades of First Amendment law in the Employment
Division ruling then prompted Congress by 1993 to enact the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which effectively restored to all Americans the pro-free-exercise
posture enshrined in the tone of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of
1978. The Supreme Court in Boerne with all the Yoder justices now gone from the
Court, overturned RFRA, and Congress in 2000 came back with a narrower
version of RFRA, the Religious Liberty Protection Act.
IV. Conclusion?

Leslie F. Goldstein
University of Delaware

